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LITERAL MEANS AND HIDDEN MEANINGS:
A NEW ANALYSIS OF SKILLFUL MEANS
Asaf Federman
Department of Psychology, University of Warwick
Introduction
Skillful means is usually used by scholars and Buddhists to denote the following sim-
ple idea: the Buddha skillfully adapted his teaching to the level of his audience.1
This very broad and somewhat oversimplified definition tries to incorporate the
whole range of Buddhist views on the subject. However, it does not help to ex-
plain why there is an extensive use of the term in central Maha¯ya¯na su¯tras while
pre-Maha¯ya¯na texts are almost completely silent on this issue. I suggest that skillful
means has not always been an all-Buddhist concept; rather, it was developed by
Maha¯ya¯nists as a radical hermeneutic device. As such, skillful means is a provoca-
tive and sophisticated idea that served the purpose of advancing a new religious ide-
ology in the face of an already established canonical knowledge. The Maha¯ya¯na use
of the concept exhibits an awareness, not found in pre-Maha¯ya¯na thought, of a gap
between what texts literally say and their hidden meaning.
In 1978 Michael Pye wrote that ‘‘ ‘skilful means’ has scarcely been attended to at
all.’’2 Since then, some attention has been given to the ethical, practical, and reli-
gious implications of the concept.3 Nevertheless, no one has ever asked why an
idea that is considered to be so central to Buddhism in general did not become
widely recognized before the arising of Maha¯ya¯na. The compound skillful means—
upa¯yakaus´alya in Sanskrit or upa¯ya kusala in Pa¯li—is not entirely a Maha¯ya¯na cre-
ation; however, in Maha¯ya¯na su¯tras it has become widely used and has been
charged with a special and novel meaning. The Maha¯ya¯na interpretation adds a
new and crucial layer to the pedagogical meaning of skillful means. It is aimed,
eventually, at convincing those at whom it was directed that a new religious path
(ya¯na) was greater than the old one. Critical reading of relevant portions of two early
Maha¯ya¯na sutras—the Lotus Su¯tra and the Skill in Means Su¯tra—shows how the
idea of skillful means is used to achieve this end: it explains how the old doctrine
was at the same time not entirely true and not entirely false. This peculiar position
is achieved by inventing an interpretive methodology, skillful means, that treats facts
as nothing but educational literature. It allows Maha¯ya¯nists to challenge central
Buddhist paradigms and offer a reorientation of the facts. The idea of skillful means
allows a rejection of old literal statements about the life of the Buddha in order to
charge them with new meaning. The old ideology is treated as skillful means; that
is, it was offered for a specific purpose and is not completely true. On the other
hand, as educational fiction, it had its good purpose.
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The idea that the doctrine is some kind of a purposeful fiction is one step further
from what is sometimes understood by skillful means: the idea that the dharma is
designed to serve a purpose. It is based on the explicit idea that what has been said
by the Buddha had a different and concealed meaning. The Pa¯li canon, for example,
contains no such distinction. In the Pa¯li canon the words and actions of the Buddha
are taken literally, and are treated as if the Buddha really meant them. There is no
recognition of a gap between words or actions on the one hand and their meaning
on the other. There is no recognition, for example, that religious goals were put for-
ward only for the sake of achieving different (or, worse, contradictory) goals. On the
other hand, in the early Maha¯ya¯na teaching of skillful means, a gap is recognized
between what the Buddha said or did and the meaning of his actions and words.
The words of the Buddha then stop being taken literally and begin to be treated as
textual entities as if they had been originally put together with concealed intentions.
Indeed, Maha¯ya¯nists came up with a novel and radical idea: in early Buddhist teach-
ing the literal level was different from the intentional level.
Why did Maha¯ya¯nists come up with such a radical idea? Primarily, I speculate,
because it solved a well-known religious problem: how to suggest a significant doc-
trinal change without appearing completely heretical. Being part of an already more
or less established tradition, ‘‘Maha¯ya¯nists’’ (probably not referring to themselves as
such) had to consider carefully the relationship with what has already been estab-
lished as the ruling paradigm. Whether this position was adopted for political rea-
sons or because of real sentiment for the old, they could not criticize the existing
body of religious facts by completely ignoring or rejecting it. The idea of skillful
means is therefore an ingenious exercise in religious reformation through reinterpre-
tation. In this sense, it is a hermeneutical device.
Two Kinds of Skillful Means
Some scholars, probably influenced by the first edition of Pye’s monograph (1978),
assert that the idea of skillful means is present even in the pre-Maha¯ya¯na forms of
Buddhism.4 It is generally accepted that the Buddha skillfully applied various means
to deliver his understanding of truth and to help other beings to progress on the path
to awakening. It is true that this pedagogical aspect of the Buddha’s activity is indeed
part of Buddhism, but strictly speaking it should not be referred to as skillful means
(in short: upa¯ya). Skillful means is a special technical term that was introduced in
early Maha¯ya¯na su¯tras. Imposing it on early Buddhist texts—as if they carried the es-
sence of upa¯ya without using the exact term—implies that the difference between
explicit and implicit references is of no significance. However, the term upa¯ya in
Maha¯ya¯na denotes a new awareness that is actually absent in pre-Maha¯ya¯na Bud-
dhism.
The Pa¯li for skillful means, upa¯ya kusala, occurs only rarely and in the Pa¯li
canon, and only one example in the Sutta Pit
˙
aka refers to the teachings of the Bud-
dha.5 One verse in the Sutta Nipa¯ta praises the one who helps many people to cross
over. Here skillful means are said to be like an oar and a rudder in rough water.6 The
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metaphor is clear: the boatman helps others to cross over by using the oar and rud-
der as the Buddha helps others with his skillful teaching. There is nothing here to
suggest, as the Maha¯ya¯na text would, that the Buddha used skillful means as a de-
ception and that he tricked his followers in the right direction. In the Dı¯gha Nika¯ya
there is a list of three skills including upa¯yakusala,7 which refers to a similar list from
the An˙guttara Nika¯ya.8 In both cases the text deals with normal skills of normal
monks who come and go (or progress and regress),9 but no reference is made to
the teaching of the Buddha.
Although scholars are generally aware that upa¯ya does not occur often in pre-
Maha¯ya¯na sources, the significance of this fact is rarely discussed. Often the Pa¯li
raft simile in the Majjhima Nika¯ya is referred to as an example of skillful means.
But a quick examination of the Pa¯li simile reveals that it expounds only a narrow
view of skillful means that significantly differs from the Maha¯ya¯na view. The story
is as follows: a man builds a raft to cross over from the dangerous bank of a river to
the safe one. Once he is across and about to continue his journey, he considers
whether he should carry the raft with him. The Buddha concludes that although the
raft served the man well for crossing over, the right thing to do is to leave it on the
river’s bank or to set it adrift in the water. The moral concludes: ‘‘So it is shown by
me, Bhikkhus, that the Dhamma is like a raft, being for crossing over not for holding
onto.’’10
The conclusion is fairly clear. When one sees that the dhamma is like a raft there
is no reason for clinging to it. The ridiculous image of a man carrying a raft on dry
land makes little room for misunderstanding. The simile indeed says that the
dhamma is of a pragmatic nature, and that one should be careful not to cling to it.
It stresses the fact that the teaching is a means to an end, and is not the end itself.
When the end is reached, the teaching can be left aside. But this is not to say that
the dhamma was delivered with concealed intentions that contradicted its literal
meaning. In the Lotus Su¯tra, as I show below, this controversial idea will become
explicit and intensified. It would reach a point where the teachings are taken not
only as skillful means, but as nothing but skillful means.
The distinction between implicit and explicit upa¯ya has been noted by Damien
Keown in his article ‘‘Paternalism in the Lotus Su¯tra.’’ Keown suggests a four-stage
evolutionary pattern of upa¯ya. He explores some of the differences between the first
stage, represented by the Pa¯li canon, and a second stage represented by the Lotus
Su¯tra.11 Keown mentions that the Buddha adapted his audience’s terminology in
order to deliver his message: ‘‘What we are seeing here is the practice of skillful
means before anyone had invented a special name for it.’’12 Regarding the second
phase he writes:
The second phase in development of the concept is found in the Lotus Su¯tra, which crys-
tallizes and makes explicit the notion of skillful means understood as a methodology for
the transmission of the Dharma.13
Keown adds that the Lotus Su¯tra’s significance lies in its claim that all teachings are
provisional and ultimately to be dismantled. He then continues to describe the other
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phases: the third (in the Vimalakı¯rtinirdes´a Su¯tra), in which skillful means becomes
explicitly a part of the bodhisattva’s development, and the forth, in which controver-
sial actions performed by advanced bodhisattvas are explained as skillful means and
are granted entry into normative ethics.14
The distinction between phases one and two is significant because it exposes
the very point where the Maha¯ya¯na shifted away from the preceding Buddhist
system(s). In the context of the first phase, the term skillful means can only be
used in a loose pedagogical sense: the Buddha used clever methods to deliver his
message in the most appropriate way. The methods should not be clung to when
the goal is reached. This is what John Hick called the ‘‘narrow sense of upa¯ya’’:
In its narrower meaning it presupposes that a teacher knows some truth which is to be
communicated to others so that they may come to see it for themselves; and the skilful
means are the devices which the teacher uses to do this. Thus in the Pa¯li scriptures the
Buddha is constantly using similes and parables and often asking skilfully leading ques-
tions.15
The implication of this is that teachings are not Truth and therefore that there is no
reason to be attached to them. Although the term skillful means is not used in the raft
simile, it roughly represents its spirit: the teachings are to be held as far as they work.
But again, this is quite different from the explicit use of the concept in Maha¯ya¯na.
In the second phase, upa¯ya becomes a distinct and self-conscious hermeneutic
tool. It clearly says that previous teachings of the Buddha were nothing but skillful
means and therefore can be replaced by new teachings or even be abandoned alto-
gether. Hick continues to explain the concept of skillful means in this manner, but
without rendering a distinction between Maha¯ya¯na and pre-Maha¯ya¯na thought. He
calls it the ‘‘comprehensive sense’’ of upa¯ya:
In its more comprehensive sense, however, the concept expresses a profound insight,
excitingly illuminating or deeply disturbing according to one’s presuppositions, into the
nature of Buddhism, and perhaps also into the nature of religion generally.16
It is profound and deeply disturbing because it suggests that the teaching of the
Buddha is provisional—a mere means to an end. In this case, strictly speaking, skill-
ful means is an abbreviation of ‘‘understanding that teachings are nothing but skillful
means.’’ Since the Buddha’s teachings were only methods that were developed for
the specific conditions of unenlightened beings, they can be replaced with new
and better teachings when the conditions change, or, better, they can be abandoned
altogether. But the message of the Lotus Su¯tra is even more provocative than this. It
suggests that the Buddha actually played tricks and deliberately deceived his fol-
lowers in order to help them achieve goals that were actually concealed from them
at the time. Not only his words but also his actions and his biography were only
means to an end. The Lotus Su¯tra treats them actually as a form of educational fic-
tion. This sense of upa¯ya is part of the message of the Lotus Su¯tra but cannot be
found in early Buddhist texts.
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Skillful Means in the Lotus Su¯tra
The Opening Section
The second chapter of the Lotus Su¯tra introduces the concept of ‘‘skillful means.’’
The Buddha opens by saying that his wisdom is beyond comprehension for pratye-
kabuddhas and s´ra¯vakas. This is, of course, a highly provocative statement, since
they are thought to be—at least by non-Maha¯ya¯na Buddhists—those who achieved
the final goal and attained liberation. Naturally, it raises a question: how come those
beings, who presumably had perfect wisdom, are now incapable of understanding?
The Buddha’s answer is that he had taught the path of pratyekabuddhas and s´ra¯vakas
only as skillful means to help beings escape suffering. In fact, he adds, it is not the
final goal. The immediate implication of this statement is that they actually did not
achieve what they thought to have achieved. The perplexity is only growing: what
are the relations between the old teachings and this new statement? Did the Buddha
deliberately lie to his disciples? Indeed, we read that arhats have all fallen into the
net of doubt.17
In the opening of the second chapter the Buddha says that his wisdom is so pro-
found that it cannot be penetrated by his followers. Surprisingly, the reason for this is
explained as follows:
Shariputra, ever since I attained Buddhahood I have through various causes and various
similes widely expounded my teaching and have used countless expedient means to
guide living beings and cause them to renounce their attachments. Why is this? Because
the Thus Come One is fully possessed of both expedient means and the paramita of
wisdom.18
The Buddha, endowed with perfect wisdom and compassion, utilizes various de-
vices to help other beings. The fact that it is hard to understand his wisdom is based
on two premises: (1) his wisdom is perfect and therefore hard to grasp, and (2) his
motivation also is perfect and hard to understand. In other words, one can only see
the limited expression of the perfect motivation of the Buddha. Hurvitz comments
that the passage from which this quote is taken is different in the Sanskrit Version




dha¯bha¯sya) of the Tatha¯gatas &c., is difficult to understand, S´a¯riputra,
because when they explain the laws (or phenomena, things) that have their causes in
themselves they do so by means of skilfulness, by display of knowledge, by arguments,
reasons, fundamental ideas, interpretation, and suggestions. By a variety of skilfulness
they are able to release creatures that are attached to one point or another. The Tatha¯-
gatas &c., S´a¯riputra, have acquired the highest perfection in skilfulness and the display
of knowledge.20
Reading skillful means as pedagogical ability shrinks the great teacher to the size of a
mundane skilled tutor—a notion that is beyond absurdity for the Lotus Su¯tra. His
way of teaching is not dependent on skillful means alone but also on the perfection
of wisdom.21 This is the first feature we meet in regard to the Lotus Su¯tra’s notion of
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skillful means—it is skillful because the Buddha’s perfections do not allow him to act
in any other way.
Let us return to the original problem of chapter 2 of the Lotus Su¯tra. The concept
of skillful means appears in the context of a controversy: did the Buddha teach three
types of vehicles to liberation or did he teach that there is (and always has been) only
one? The su¯tra leaves no room for speculation: the true teaching of the Buddha is
aimed only at Buddhahood.22 The goal of Buddhahood is superior to the goals of
pratyekabuddhas and s´ra¯vakas; these two were taught for the benefit of beings
with strong attachments and little wisdom.23 These paths were, hence, only means
to help beings enter the one and only path to Buddhahood, which is called also
ekaya¯na (the only vehicle), maha¯ya¯na (the great vehicle), or buddhaya¯na (the vehicle
that leads to being a Buddha). On top of these teachings, all similes, parables, su¯tras,
logical expositions, the teaching of nirva¯n
˙
a, the end of suffering, and even the life
and death of the Buddha were—according to the Lotus Su¯tra—skillful means used
by the Buddha for the sake of attracting those beings to the buddhaya¯na. Since skill-
ful means is the product of the enormous wisdom and extreme compassion of the
Buddha, it cannot be morally wrong in any sense. Providing this premise at the be-
ginning of the chapter helps to solve a problem that will arise sooner or later: it looks
as if the Buddha had deliberately deceived his disciples by not revealing the whole
picture.
This exposition, of course, only strengthens the division seen earlier between the
audience and the Buddha. As Paul Williams states, the Buddha in this context is in-
finitely superior to anyone else; his understanding of the dharma ‘‘can only be un-
derstood and shared between Buddhas.’’24 Even S´a¯riputra, who is considered to be
an arhat by the early tradition, cannot understand the dharma realized by the Bud-
dha since—and the su¯tra definitely uses any opportunity for telling us this—‘‘only
those who are Buddhas can understand it.’’25
It is no surprise that a thread of confusion and bewilderment, expressed by the
audience, accompanies this chapter. If Buddhas alone know the true meaning of the
teaching, what is the status of the very text that makes the claim? Is this another ex-
pression of skillful means that should not be taken literally? If so, what is the true
meaning behind it? Assuming that we are yet not Buddhas, can we actually under-
stand the su¯tra? In other words, it is a version of the paradox ‘‘no one can understand
this sentence.’’26
A way to solve the problem is by stressing the idea that the religious practice
should involve a great deal of faith and belief. Since one cannot fully understand
the ultimate meaning of the teachings, one should accept that they are coming
from a source of infinite wisdom and compassion beyond one’s understanding. In-
deed, bodhisattvas can understand the incomprehensible dharma because they are
‘‘firm in the power of faith.’’27 S´a¯riputra is told that he and others ‘‘should with single
mind[s] believe and accept the words of the Buddha.’’28 Moreover, ‘‘it is because
they have faith in the Buddha’s words that they can comply with this su¯tra not be-
cause of any wisdom of their own.’’29 This point should draw our attention to an im-
portant issue. It shows that the Lotus Su¯tra is aware of its being a text—it does not
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pretend to serve as a transparent medium that reflects truth as it is. This awareness is
inseparable from the way the Lotus Su¯tra understands upa¯ya: the teachings of the
Buddha were never completely transparent and should never have been taken liter-
ally.30
Skillful Means in the Similes
The Lotus Su¯tra makes use of similes and parables to further clarify upa¯ya, ‘‘for
through similes and parables those who are wise obtain understanding.’’31 Some rel-
evant issues arise from the similes. There is a tremendous gap between what the
Buddha knows and what his followers know. This gap allows the Buddha to use all
kinds of trickery and deception for their benefit. Surprisingly, we, the readers of the
su¯tra, share the same point of view with the Buddha. The historical deception is
exposed in front of our privileged eyes. In addition, it is clear that the eyes of the
followers were blinded to the true situation by lack of knowledge. This is one major
justification for using the deceptive ‘‘skillful means.’’ All similes end with a revela-
tion of truth and come together with a full justification of the trickery. This reflects
the status of the Lotus Su¯tra itself as the exposer of high truth.
The Burning House
The most famous of all the parables is probably the story of the burning house. The
following is a brief summary of the story. The house of a rich man is set on fire. His
children are playing inside the house, so focused on their games that they ignore the
danger. The man thinks about different ways for saving his children like grabbing
them all and taking them by force, or directly explaining to them the nature of the
danger. However, these solutions are doomed to fail because of physical limitations
and the children’s blindness toward the danger. Then, the man thinks: ‘‘I must now
invent some expedient means that will make it possible for the children to escape
the harm.’’32 Being aware of his children’s passions, he tells them of the wonderful
toys that are waiting for them outside the house—a goat cart, a deer cart, and an ox
cart. When the children are out and safe he gives each of them a fantastically deco-
rated carriage pulled by white oxen—even better then the promised toys!
The toy vehicles stand for the lesser vehicles—pratyekabuddhaya¯na and
s´ra¯vakaya¯na—the great oxen carriage represents the buddhaya¯na. We are left with
the small ox cart, which should represent a lesser vehicle, but because of the ox
it implies similarity to the buddhaya¯na oxen carriage. In fact, there are no three
vehicles, pratyekabuddhaya¯na, s´ra¯vakaya¯na, and buddhaya¯na, but only one, bud-
dhaya¯na. The buddhaya¯na, which was thought previously to be one of three
vehicles, is actually, according to the Lotus Su¯tra, the only one that actually exists.33
On top of all this, in the analysis of the story S´a¯riputra admits that the carriage was
not so important (in the story), since the skillful means of the rich man would have
worked even without any compensation—after all, he saved their lives! What is im-
portant in the eyes of the su¯tra is the benevolent motivation of the father—the rest is
only means.
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This story presents a basic idea regarding skillful means. It is done for the sake of
beings that are trapped in a dangerous situation without knowing that they are in
danger. It involves tempting and attracting them to a safe place, in which a better
gain is offered. It presents the aspects of lying, motivation, and results. Keown makes
a helpful distinction between the intention to lie and the motivation. The motiva-
tion is surely justified, while there is not any doubt, according to this story, that the
Buddha/father intended to lie.34 The su¯tra claims that when the motivation and
results are good, and the benefit of someone else is under consideration, what seems
to be lying is actually not lying. In the words of the su¯tra the father ‘‘did not commit
a falsehood.’’35 This suggests, hence, that the former teachings of the Buddha, the
teachings of the three paths to liberation, carried the attributes of lying for bring-
ing better results. However, due to benevolent motivation this cannot be con-
demned.
The Phantom City
A similar idea is expressed in the story of the phantom city. Here, again, there is a
lie, or a trick, which turns out to be to the benefit of those who are deceived. In a
nutshell, a magician guide creates a resting place in the middle of the wilderness so
that his band can relax before continuing on to their goal, to the real city.36 From the
various translations of the title Burton’s ‘‘phantom city’’ is the most adequate be-
cause it exemplifies the fact that the city is real and not real at the same time. It is
real because the group can actually rest there and escape the dreadful road. It is
not real because the leader creates it and makes it disappear by his will, and because
it is contrasted with another city, the goal of the trip, which is not created by the
leader.
With this story we get more information about the status of skillful means with
regard to truth. What the Buddha had previously taught is both true and not true.
Teaching nirva¯n
˙
a to pratyekabuddhas and s´ra¯vakas was not a simple lie or a vulgar
trick; it was like the creation of a phantom camp in the middle of the way to the real
goal. ‘‘The other two nirvanas are preached to provide a resting place.’’37 The need
for this story arises from the fact that the hearer of the su¯tra could have felt that the
two paths were nothing else but pure trickery.38 The story, hence, explains the rela-
tions between the new teaching and the old teaching.
A second aspect of this story touches the issue of gain and loss. When the jour-
ney is difficult, the members of the wandering group complain that they would like
to turn around and go back.39 If they do so they will lose the chance to enter the
treasure city, the final goal of their journey. But entering the phantom city has them
feeling ‘‘overjoyed in mind’’ and at ‘‘complete ease and tranquillity.’’40 It seems as if
they will stay there forever unless the leader wipes away the phantom experience.
By deserting the resting place the people achieve a greater gain; however, only the
leader, who alone can compare the phantom city to the treasure city, knows this. He
causes the phantom city to disappear, an act that must be understood as an allegory
for wiping away the teachings of various paths. This is exactly what the Lotus Su¯tra
does.
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The Lost Son
The third story to be analyzed here is that of the son who did not recognize his fa-
ther. A young man leaves his father and wanders abroad for years. Later he acciden-
tally comes to the city where his father lives; in the meantime the father has become
very wealthy. The father recognizes the son, but the son does not recognize the fa-
ther. The father realizes the difficult situation and does not reveal his relationship to
him. Instead he employs the son, slowly building up his confidence until he can treat
him as an adopted son and give him responsibilities for the whole estate. At last the
father, who is near the end of his life, calls together many witnesses and reveals the
true, original relationship.
According to the su¯tra, the father acts skillfully three times. First, he recognizes
the problem and avoids using direct action; second, he gives his son smaller jobs,
but pays him double; third, he makes an effort to be close to him and gain his trust,
an act that helps to build the son’s confidence. As in the two previous stories there is
a gap between what the chief character knows and what the others know, and trick-
ery and disguise take place to benefit someone.41
We—the readers or hearers of the story—share the point of view held by the all-
knowing character. We know what the son does not know. If only he had known the
true situation, there would not have been a need for the father to engage in all of this
difficult deception! This feature, however, is unique to this story and not present in
the others. The low position occupied by the son at the beginning could, hypotheti-
cally, have been exchanged for a higher position at any given time, including at the
very beginning. The only thing that separated him from this high position was his
own ignorance. This cannot mean anything else but that we are actually the sons
of the Buddha, although this fact has been hidden from us for a long time and for
good reasons.
Another interesting feature of upa¯ya is revealed in the final act. Toward the end
of his life, the father reveals his use of skillful means and proclaims the true story.
This again is a self-reference to the teaching of skillful means in the Lotus Su¯tra.
The final act is not only about the status of a previous teaching but also about the
status of this very story in this very su¯tra. The father shares his point of view with
the son in the same way that the Lotus Su¯tra shares the Buddha’s point of view with
us.
To sum up the similes, there are five common features to the stories about skillful
means. First, there is a gap between what one character knows and what the others
know. This is the gap between the truth, known by the Buddha, and the relative and
often mistaken view of the others. Second, we, the readers/hearers of the su¯tra, share
the same point of view with the all-knowing character. Third, the other characters
suffer from some sort of blindness to the situation, ignorance of some sort, fear, or a
limited view. Due to this, the all-knowing character cannot reveal the truth as a
whole and is forced to use skillful means. Fourth, his motivation is compassion,
and he acts with wisdom, understanding well the situation and the limits of the
others. Finally, by the end of the story, the truth is revealed together with a full justi-
fication for the trickery involved.
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The similes reveal the importance of the interplay of literal expressions and their
meaning. On one level the su¯tra tells stories in which there is a clear gap between
what is said and what is meant. This shall be referred to as the ‘‘text level.’’ On this
level the distinctions are clear—the all-knowing character helps the underprivileged
followers, who are saved by not knowing the truth. On a higher meta-textual level,
the reader (or the hearer) shares a point of view with the producer of true meaning—
that is, the Buddha. Hearers are thus encouraged to feel privileged in their critical
position, because they can now see what has been previously disguised. For the
readers this experience is one of revelation. It assists in the setting aside of wrong
ideas and concepts, and the achieving of a new orientation toward the real goal. At
this level the readers of the su¯tra seem to be saved by knowing the truth. But this
truth is rather elusive. Although it precisely exposes what is not true, that is, the pre-
vious conceptions of three vehicles, et cetera, it offers hardly any positive content to
contemplate. The lucid demonstration of skillful means does not counteract the
statement that only Buddhas share the point of view of Buddhas.
There are two possible solutions to this apparent difficulty; both are found in the
su¯tra and both are Maha¯ya¯na novelties. First, because the Buddha is infinitely higher
than the follower, and because his point of view is so privileged, the follower pro-
gresses and establishes himself on the path by growing in faith. Second, as the
meta-textual level of the simile suggests, the follower can actually share the same
point of view as the Buddha because he is, in a sense, already on the path to Bud-
dhahood; he simply is not aware of this fact. Like the returning son, the ignorant fol-
lower possesses all the necessary attributes to perform well, without actually having
an awareness of his true nature. When this problem is resolved, everything else is
taken care of. Using the idea of skillful means, the Lotus Su¯tra promotes these two
doctrinal ideas and at the same time digests, or, as one scholar has put it, ‘‘canni-
balizes’’ the early doctrine.42
Skillful Means and the ‘‘Historical’’ Buddha
One section of the Lotus Su¯tra demonstrates how the life of the historical Buddha
was in fact a manifestation of skillful means.43 We learn that the Buddha actually
attained Buddhahood in a relatively short time. His life span ‘‘is an immeasurable
number of asamkhya kalpas,’’ and during this time he has ‘‘constantly abided here
without ever entering extinction.’’44 This fits, of course, very well with the Maha¯ya¯-
nic view that the Buddha is still present and can continue to provide teachings even
after his apparent death.45
In the Lotus Su¯tra, there are two reasons why a human life-course manifests it-
self, and both involve skillful means. First, the Buddha, by manifesting a normal hu-
man life, tells his followers that he is going to die. Knowing this, they understand that
‘‘it is a rare thing to live at a time when one of the Buddhas appears in the world,’’46
and, hence, they make the extra effort and achieve progress on the path.47 What
we know about the life of the Buddha S´a¯kyamuni comes from a narrative that is
very much like a staged play in which the Buddha is an actor. In this way life
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becomes fictional presentation, a text, a performance. It represents something other
than itself. Second, the Buddha tells his life story for those who are ‘‘meager in vir-
tue and heavy with defilement.’’48 Because they ‘‘delight in a little Law’’ and are in
need of inspiration, he describes how he left his household and attained Buddha-
hood.49 The following passage leaves no doubt concerning the interpretation of the
narrative: ‘‘the scriptures expounded by the Thus Come One are all for the purpose
of saving and emancipating living beings.’’50 I have no access to the original Chi-
nese but it seems that Hurvitz, Watson, Kubo, and Yuyama agree that this sentence
refers to a previous Buddhist canonical text.51 Whether ‘‘scriptures’’ here denotes a
written text or an oral one is an open question; however, there is little doubt that
it refers to an actual body of words. The Sanskrit uses the term dharmaparya¯ya,
which means ‘‘a way of preaching the Dharma’’ and directly refers to the form of
early teachings as presented in the early su¯tras/suttas.52 In this context, dharma-
parya¯ya is treated precisely as a fictional story for the purposes of education. The his-
tory of the Buddha is treated as story, a fiction, something that does not represent
actual fact.
In the Upa¯yakaus´alya Su¯tra this idea is expanded to the maximum. In this su¯tra
skillful means explains (or at least tries to) every tiny bit of information about the life
of S´a¯kyamuni. Why did the bodhisattva enter into a trance in the shade of a Jambu
Tree? Why did he leave home at midnight? Why did he practice austerities for six
years? Why did he receive food before his awakening? Why did he not gain enlight-
enment before Ma¯ra¯ arrived? Without going into detail, all these questions (and
many more) have a common answer: all this was done as part of his teaching, in
order to help and encourage other beings to take the path.53
The life of the Buddha as a whole becomes a lesson in ‘‘skillful means.’’ History
becomes story. Furthermore, the old biography is replaced by a new biography in
which the Buddha has practiced the bodhisattva path and has attained Buddhahood
many eons before. Every event in his life, including the mere fact that he had ‘‘a
life,’’ is said to be a staged performance for the benefit of his followers.
Conclusion
Upa¯ya in the Lotus Su¯tra serves as an explanatory and apologetic instrument for jus-
tifying a new approach to Buddhist teachings. It reads previous teachings as texts,
not as facts, and offers new textual interpretations. The literal understanding of the
teachings is directly criticized—they are presented as lies and tricks aimed at the
least capable of followers. They should really be understood, says the su¯tra, as ex-
pression of skillful means; they have hidden and hard-to-grasp meanings. The idea
that the Buddha may say one thing but intend another is radically new. It exposes a
high degree of awareness to the hermeneutic possibilities regarding doctrine and bi-
ography. This maneuver is done in order to justify a new doctrine embodying a
strong faith element. As such, it is a winning formula: it defends a new doctrine with-
out totally condemning the previous one. It manages to digest the previous teachings
into a bigger and improved system of thought.
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As seen in the story of the burning house, the teaching of the three vehicles, al-
though a lie, is not seen as morally wrong. This duality features in the other stories
as well. In this way the Lotus Su¯tra hugs the old teachings to death, offering a new
reading of what is already known, and possibly canonical, scriptural truths. ‘‘Can-
nibalizing’’ texts, as Harrison calls it, does not necessarily demand that a written
format be present in front of the ‘‘cannibal.’’54 However, it does demand the exis-
tence of a fixed text of some sort—oral or written. After a text becomes fixed, new
tactics may be employed to attack it. One tactic might be to ridicule the mere cre-
ation, the raison d’eˆtre, of the old text; another might be to defend the superior po-
sition of the attacking text. Upa¯ya serves both. It tells us that old teachings were
designed for those who lacked wisdom, but at the same time it offers an opportu-
nity to see the Lotus Su¯tra as a teaching of higher order. This kind of teaching, we
are told, should be preached and preserved and should be approached with great
faith.
Skillful means here is a hermeneutic device that helps to justify the process of
reinterpretation of the historical narrative of the life of the Buddha and his teachings.
The division between history, story, life-story, and teaching does not seem to be of
great importance for the su¯tra. As shown above, the actual life of the Buddha be-
comes another type of skillful means, exactly like other stories, similes, and parables.
This can only happen after the biography and the teaching have achieved a certain
canonical status. Of course, no biography of the Buddha that we know of can be
considered as simply a historical or factual account. It is clear, for example, that
the story in the Ariyapariyesana¯ Sutta has its own special purposes and therefore is
better seen as hagiography than history.55 Nevertheless, the Pa¯li text does not ac-
knowledge the double meaning that characterizes the concept of upa¯ya. In the Pa¯li
text, facts are at least presented as facts. This attitude is definitely absent in the Lotus
Su¯tra and in the Upa¯yakaus´alya Su¯tra. There, although one story is told, another is
true. If we call the old story ‘‘text,’’ then upa¯ya serves as a commentarial reaction
that exposes its true and counter-literal meaning.
In the eyes of the Lotus Su¯tra there is a clear distinction between the apparent
‘‘objects’’ of reality, either the teachings or the actual life of the Buddha, and their
true meaning. Upa¯ya explains how previous knowledge about the teachings, the
goals, the paths, and the biography of the teacher is both unreal and real. It is a
phantom. In this way, the new Maha¯ya¯na ideology manages to reject the old, to offer
a new religious orientation, and at the same time avoid complete heresy. After all, it
claims, the tricks, deceptions, and lies were all skillful means: they were all designed
by perfect wisdom and for a perfectly good cause.
Skillful means is therefore not a mere pedagogical device of matching the right
simile to the right person. It is also not exactly the idea that the teachings should be
abandoned after a person reaches a goal. It is rather a sophisticated explanatory tool
that enables a new religious movement to claim that what has been widely accepted
as true is actually not true, and that truth is, and has always been, something else.
It is a pointer to a new gap that has been recognized between textual facts—
biographical facts and doctrinal facts—and their other, hidden, meaning.
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Notes
1 – See, e.g., Williams 1989, p. 143; Pye 2003, p. 1; and Gombrich 1996, p. 17.
2 – The quote is from Pye 1978, p. 2.
3 – Schroeder 2002, Schroeder 2004, and Hick 2004.
4 – Pye (2003, p. 119) writes: ‘‘The way in which the term [upa¯ya] comes to prom-
inence in the Maha¯ya¯na reflects characteristics of early Buddhism which are
themselves generally reckoned to be of central importance.’’ Gombrich (1996,
p. 17) writes: ‘‘It is true that the term translated ‘skill in means’ upa¯ya-kaus´alya,
is post-canonical, but the exercise of the skill to which it refers, the ability to
adapt one’s message to the audience, is of enormous importance in the Pa¯li
canon.’’ Schroeder (2000, p. 562) writes: ‘‘An obvious example of ‘‘skillful
means’’ in the pre-Maha¯ya¯na Pa¯li canon is found in the Majjhima Nika¯ya. In
a famous section of this text, the Buddha describes his teachings as ‘‘rafts’’
that are used to ferry sentient beings across the turbulent waters of sam
˙
sa¯ra,
and says that one should refrain from seeing his teachings as more than help-
ful devices.’’ Hick (2004, par. 4) writes: ‘‘It [the concept of upa¯ya] first ap-
pears in this broader sense in the Buddha’s parable of the raft in the Majjhima
Nika¯ya.’’
5 – Although there is little hard evidence that the complete canon that has arrived
to us existed when Maha¯ya¯na began, it is widely accepted that that at least por-
tions of it go back as far as the third century B.C.E. (Gethin 1998, p. 42; Gom-
brich 1996, pp. 8–10). These portions are considered earlier than the earliest




arı¯ka Su¯tra and other Maha¯ya¯na texts (Pye 2003,
p. 178; Williams 1989, p. 142). These portions do not contain anything re-
motely close to the early Maha¯ya¯na idea of skillful means. There may be one
hypothetical objection to using the Pa¯li canon as an example for the nonexis-
tence of upa¯ya in pre-Maha¯yana thought: the Therava¯da tradition might have
known all about it but erased any trace of the concept from the Pa¯li. However,
it is not only the term that is missing but also the awareness of the gap between
literal expressions and their hidden meaning.




ham a¯ruhitva¯, piyen’ arittena saman˙gibhu¯to so
ta¯raye tattha bahu¯ pi an˜n˜e, tatru¯payan˜n˜u¯ kusalo mutı¯ma¯’’ (Andersen and
Smith 1913, p. 56).
7 – D iii 220.
8 – A iii 431 (Morris 1887, p. 431).
9 – See Pye 2003, p. 118, for a discussion and comparison of two translations of
the paragraph. Either way the An˙guttara and Dı¯gha Nika¯yas do not use upa¯ya
in the same technical way that the Lotus Su¯tra does.





attha¯ya’’ (Trenckner 1925, p. 135).
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11 – Keown 1998.
12 – Ibid., p. 202.
13 – Ibid.
14 – Ibid., p. 203.
15 – Hick 2004, pars. 2–3.
16 – Ibid.
17 – Watson 1993, pp. 26–28. In this section I have used two English translations
of the Lotus Su¯tra, one by Watson (1993) and one by Kubo and Yuyama
(1993). Page numbers refer to the translation made by Watson unless otherwise
stated.
18 – Watson 1993, p. 24.
19 – Hurvitz 1976, p. 349.
20 – Kern 1884/1963, pp. 30–31. For comparison see also Hurvitz 1976, p. 349.
21 – Borrowing a beautiful example from the prajn˜a¯-pa¯ramita¯ literature: ‘‘as a bird
needs two wings to maintain itself in the air, so a bodhisattva needs both wis-
dom and skill in means to hold himself up in emptiness’’ (Conze 1968, p. 44).
22 – ‘‘The thus come one has only a single Buddha vehicle’’ (Watson 1993, p. 31).
23 – Watson 1993, p. 34.
24 – Williams 1989, p. 143.
25 – Watson 1993, p. 31.
26 – The difference is that instead of ‘‘no one’’ we have ‘‘only buddhas’’ (see also
note 30 below).
27 – Watson 1993, p. 25.
28 – Ibid., p. 33.
29 – Ibid., p. 73.
30 – Another way of solving the paradox is to acknowledge that being a Buddha is
actually not as difficult and rare an achievement as it seems. Thus, the paradox
‘‘only Buddhas can understand this sentence’’ is solved when one acknowl-
edges that in fact everyone is already a Buddha. There is some evidence that
this position is found in the Lotus Su¯tra (Kubo 2008).
31 – Watson 1993, p. 56.
32 – Ibid., p. 57.
33 – Williams 2000, p. 169.
34 – Keown 1998, p. 194.
35 – Watson 1993, p. 58.
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36 – Ibid., pp. 135–136.
37 – Ibid., p. 142.
38 – The term upa¯ya basically means a way to achieve a goal, but it may carry a
slight negative meaning as well when it is rendered as ‘a trick’ or ‘a way to
win the enemy’ (see definitions in Monier-Williams 1899/1999 and Rhys
Davids 1921–1925). The Chinese equivalent (fang-pien), too, as Pye indicates,
does not necessarily carry a positive ethical meaning when used outside the
Buddhist context (Pye 2003, p. 12).
39 – Watson 1993, p. 136.
40 – Ibid.
41 – It is also common to the two stories about the hidden jewel, which are not
discussed here. These stories, found in the eighth and fourteenth chapters of
Kuma¯rajı¯va’s version, do not give new significant information about skillful
means on top of what is provided by the other stories. Basically, the gap be-
tween knowing and not knowing is there, as well as the fact that if the person
had only known he had a jewel, his life would be different.
42 – Harrison 2004, p. 20 n. 53.
43 – Watson 1993, p. 227.
44 – Ibid. (both quotes).
45 – Williams 2000, p. 108. As for the su¯tra itself, there is no debate about the date
or place of its composition. The frame story suggests that the Buddha is speak-
ing on this very earth during his lifetime (and not, for example, in another heav-
enly place). We know that Chinese tradition did not see any difficulty in the
Lotus Su¯tra’s being the last teaching of the historical Buddha before his appar-
ent death. Nevertheless, scholars agree that it was composed sometimes be-
tween the first century B.C.E. and the first century C.E., several hundred years
after the death of the Buddha (see Williams 2000, p. 169; for a detailed ac-
count based on the work of Japanese scholars see Pye 2003, p. 178).
46 – Watson 1993, p. 227.
47 – Even the Buddha’s (apparent) death aims to achieve the same purpose, as
shown by the simile of the physician who faked his death in order to save his
poisoned and out-of-their-mind sons.
48 – Watson 1993, p. 226.
49 – Ibid.
50 – Ibid.
51 – Hurvitz (1976, p. 239) translates the Chinese as ‘‘the scriptural canon preached
by the Thus Come One is all for the purpose of conveying living beings to de-
liverance.’’ Kubo and Yuyama (1993, p. 237) translate this as ‘‘The sutras
which the Tatha¯gata has expounded are all to save the sentient beings.’’
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52 – The equivalent Pa¯li (pariya¯ya) is specifically used in the Abhidhamma to de-
note the mode of teaching in the suttas, the illustrated and figurative presenta-
tions that are not abstract and not technical in character (Pa¯li English Dictio-
nary, pariya¯ya no. 5, p. 433).
53 – Tatz 1994, pp. 60–68.
54 – Harrison 2004, p. 20 n. 53.
55 – M i 164 (Trenckner 1925, p. 164).
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